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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN QUAS# Case No. 890601-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In addition to relying on and reasserting the contents 
of his opening brief, Mr. Quas replies to Appellee's Brief as 
follows: 
Mr. Quas maintains that the district court had 
jurisdiction to quash the improper bindover in this case. 
Given the confusion in the district courts concerning 
jurisdiction over bindover quashal prior to the Gordan, Humphreyy 
and Mathews opinions, the continuing uncertainty of the 
conclusion reached in the Gordan# Humphrey, and Mathews opinions# 
and Mr. Quas' position that bindover quashal lies within the 
jurisdiction of the district courts, this Court should address 
the merits of Mr. Quas' successive preliminary hearing/due 
process argument. 
In reviewing the merits of the due process issuef there 
are two relevant questions before this Court: 1) what is the 
standard for reversing the dismissal of informations for 
insufficient evidence? and 2) did the State meet this standard? 
The State's proposed standard leaves the discretion for 
1 
refiling informations with the prosecutors, and thus violates 
the fundamental intent of the Brickey decision. 
Applying the correct standard for reversal of 
dismissals (requiring new or previously unavailable evidence that 
has surfaced, or other good cause) in this case leads to the 
conclusions that the prosecution did not meet the standard, and 
that the reversal of the dismissal order in this case violated 
Mr. Quas1 right to due process of law. 
The State's profile evidence and argument that Susan 
Quas was murdered because other suicide victims behave 
differently than she did were plain error. Even if the State's 
experts were qualified to render their opinions that it was 
unlikely that Susan Quas committed suicide because she did not 
fit within the behavioral profile of suicide victims, the 
opinions should have been excluded because the prejudicial 
impact of this testimony outweighed its probative value. 
In reviewing the admission of Mr. Quas" custodial 
statements, the trial court failed to apply Utah Constitutional 
law relied on by Mr. Quas, apparently following the prosecutor's 
argument that the State Constitutional precedent was superseded 
by Federal Constitutional law promulgated by federal courts. 
After correcting the trial court's error of law in 
finding federal precedent controlling over Utah Constitutional 
precedent, this Court should apply the proper Utah standard and 
find that Mr. Quas' custodial statements were taken in violation 
of his right against self-incrimination. 
2 
The State•s arguments that Mr. Quas' statements to 
police officers, presented in the State's case-in-chief, were 
impeachment evidence; that this issue was waived; and that the 
admission of the statements was rendered harmless by the 
admission of the statements themselves and other evidence are 
incorrect. 
When read in context, Susan Quas1 statements that the 
police would one day come to the Quas residence to find that Mr. 
Quas had killed her, and that Mr. Quas was the guilty one do not 
reflect a state of mind sufficiently relevant to Mrs. Quas' 
behavior on the night of her death to justify the enormously 
prejudicial impact of their admission. 
Mr. Quas was entitled to have the jury instructed 
correctly on his theory of the case and the applicable law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DISTRICT COURTS HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO QUASH IMPROPER 
BINDOVER ORDERS. 
Mr. Quas stands by his argument that district courts 
1 
have jurisdiction to quash bindover orders. While this Court's 
opinions in the Gordan, Humphrey, and Mathews cases rule 
otherwise, a petition for certiorari will be filed in the Utah 
Supreme Court in those cases. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD 
REACH THE MERITS OF THE 
IMPROPER BINDOVER ISSUE. 
1 See Point II of Appellant's opening brief. 
3 
At the time the trial court in the instant case ruled 
that it did not have jurisdiction over the magistrate's bindover 
order, there was a good deal of confusion in the district courts 
over the jurisdictional question. See petition for interlocutory 
appeal filed in State v. Gordan, Case No. 890130 (appending three 
different district court rulings on the issue). 
Citing Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 
1989), and State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 270 (Utah 1985), the 
State claims that Mr. Quas should have sought an interlocutory 
2 
appeal from the bindover order in the Utah Supreme Court. 
While that code section does provide Utah Supreme Court 
jurisdiction over "interlocutory appeals from any court of record 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony,", the 
magistrate who issued the bindover order was not acting as a 
court of record in presiding over the preliminary hearings. 
While Schreuder does contain language indicating that the Utah 
Supreme Court's interlocutory appeal jurisdiction "governs" 
appeals from bindover orders, the language is dicta* . 
2 Appellee's brief at 12-13. 
3 See Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 
1977)(magistrate is separate statutory jurisdiction, and those 
acting as magistrates do not invoke the jurisdiction of other 
(i.e. circuit) courts); Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-1; 78-1-2 
(omitting magistrates from enumeration of courts of record). 
4 In Schreuder, the defendant claimed that because his 
preliminary hearing took place in the trial court, he was 
deprived equal protection of the law because he did not have a 
higher court to go to for review of the bindover order. The 
Supreme Court reviewed the bindover order, thus ensuring him 
equal protection of the law. The court apparently was not faced 
with nor reached the question of its jurisdiction to do so. 
4 
Mr* Quas maintains that the district court should have 
exercised its jurisdiction to quash the improper bindover order# 
and that this Court should both clarify the jurisdictional issue 
and address the propriety of the bindover order in this case. 
III. 
THE STATE FAILED TO MEET 
THE PROPER STANDARD FOR 
REVERSAL OF THE INITIAL DISMISSAL 
OF THE INFORMATION. 
Mr. Quas, after analyzing and quoting extensively from 
the Brickey decision and cases cited therein, proposed as the 
standard for reversal of dismissals of informations based on 
insufficient evidence the following: "[T]he prosecutor [must] 
show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or 
that other good cause justifies refiling." It is Mr. Quas1 
position that when the refiling of the information is based on 
new or previously unavailable evidence, "new or previously 
unavailable" means evidence that was not available to the State 
at the first preliminary hearing. 
The State apparently would have this Court adopt the 
standard allowing reversal of dismissals of informations when the 
prosecution presents "such evidence that with due diligence could 
have been available at the first preliminary examination." 
The Harper language quoted by the State in support of 
5 Appellant's opening brief at 15 through 21, quoting 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986)(emphasis added). 
6 Appellant's opening brief at 17. 
7 Appellee's brief at 15, quoting Harper v. District 
Court, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. 1971). 
5 
its proposed standard for refiling appears to contain a 
typographical error (missing the word not, provided in brackets 
below), particularly when read in context, 
We point out further, that the Jones v.. 
State, supra, decision does not preclude the 
district attorney from offering for further 
consideration - a charge - which was 
dismissed at an ecirlier preliminary 
examination, when additional newly discovered 
evidence is later obtained; meaning however, 
such evidence that with due diligence could 
[not] have been available at the first 
preliminary examination. That decision 
merely requires that the prosecutor may not 
take his dismissed case - with the same 
evidence - refile it - and submit it to a 
magistrate more likely to be favorable. 
That decision requires that the first 
magistrate, who considered the information 
and evidence; and rendered a decision; shall 
consider the good cause offered and the new 
evidence, in relation to that upon which his 
earlier decision was premised. In short, for 
good cause shown, and subject to the 
presentment of new evidenced the charge may 
be refiled. 
Harper, at 897. Subsequent Oklahoma case law on the standard for 
refiling informations supports Mr. Quas" reading of Harper. See 
e.g., Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616, 620 (Okl.Cr. Sept. 1, 
1971)("At the outset of such a preliminary the State has the 
burden to convince the examining magistrate that there is 
additional new evidence not presented and unavailable at the 
previous preliminary which requires re-examination of the 
dismissal.")(emphasis added); Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142, 
1143-1144 (Okla.Cr. 1973)(We stated in that case [Jones] that 
"new" or "additional" evidence does not mean that which was known 
to the State at the time of the first preliminary or that which 
6 
could have been easily acquired by it, 481 P.2d at 171....The 
magistrate must decide if the substance of the new evidence 
offered is sufficient to overcome the prior dismissal and whether 
the State has shown good cause why that evidence was not 
available to it at the first preliminary hearing.")(emphasis 
added)• 
Assuming that the State's interpretation of the Harper 
opinion were the governing standard in Oklahoma, such a standard 
would grant prosecutors completely unbridled discretion to refile 
cases, and would directly contradict the Brickey court's explicit 
intention to remove discretion for refiling cases from the 
8 
prosecution. 
Additionally, the holding of the Harper case relied on 
by the State is not applicable to refiling informations, but 
instead provides guidance for granting continuances in those 
preliminary hearings where prosecutors innocently miscalculate 
the quantum of evidence necessary to make a showing of probable 
cause and have evidence reasonably available to present at the 
9 
continuation without causing undue delay. Even if the Harper 
8 Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). 
9 The Harper court explained, 
[I]n the event the prosecutor 
miscalculates and fails to present sufficient 
evidence to show probable cause to bind over 
the accused, but possesses other witnesses 
whose testimony would strengthen his showing, 
it is clearly within the discretion of the 
examining magistrate to grant the state a 
continuance for that purpose. However, it is 
presumed that the additional witnesses, or 
7 
continuance standard were applicable to cases involving 
refilings, it is inapplicable in this case, which involved a 
prosecutor consciously refusing to present the pivotal gunshot 
residue evidence requested by the magistrate to support probable 
cause (T.814 2-5, 7), rather than a prosecutor innocently 
miscalculating the necessary quantum of evidence-
The State's characterization of Mr. Qucis ' proposed 
standard as a standard requiring new evidence to "jump out of the 
bushes", presents an unduly limited reading of the Brickey 
standard, which allows refiling when the prosecution presents new 
evidence or other good cause for refiling. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 
647. In cases in which the State is unable to me*et the new 
12 
evidence prong of the Brickey refiling standard,. the State has 
the opportunity to make a showing that other good cause exists 
for refiling. 
other evidence, are reasonably available; and 
that a continuance will not be sought in 
order to conduct further investigation 
seeking that evidence, in a dilatory mcinner. 
Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 484 P.2d 891, 892 
(Okla. Cr. April 21, 1971). 
10 The Brickey court properly noted the application of 
that Harper rule to continuances to accommodate prosecutors 
innocently miscalculating the quantum of evidence necessary. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 n.5 (Utah 1986). 
11 Appellee's brief at 14. 
12 The only evidence presented in this case by the State 
that was unavailable at the first preliminary heciring was the 
testimony of Kristine Knudson, which showed inconsistencies in 
Mr. Quas's statements, which inconsistencies the magistrate had 
already noted at the first preliminary hearing. See Appellant's 
opening brief at 23-24. 
8 
The State's effort to assuage the Brickey due process 
violation by arguing that the magistrate was wrong in her 
13 
original dismissal of the information for lack of evidence is 
neither the proper mode of challenging the magistrate's 
14 
dismissal nor relevant to this appeal. 
IV. 
THE ADMISSION OF 
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING THE BEHAVIORAL PROFILE 
OF SUICIDE VICTIMS 
WAS PLAIN ERROR. 
In State v. Braun# 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App. 
1990)# this Court explained that the plain error doctrine is used 
as a tool to see that justice is done# in the following manner: 
We note that the two plain error 
requirements of obviousness and harmfulness 
are related and that the obviousness 
requirement poses no rigid and insurmountable 
barrier to review. For examplef the more 
harmful an error is# the more likely an 
appellate court is to conclude that it was 
objectively obvious, because a high degree of 
harmfulness might be expected to attract a 
trial court's attention. On the other hand/ 
in appropriate cases we can exercise our 
discretion to dispense with the requirement 
of obviousness# so that justice can be done# 
as when an error not readily apparent to the 
court or counsel proves harmful in 
retrospect. 
... At bottom^ the plain error rule's 
purpose is to permit us to avoid injustice. 
No statement of the factors that are 
important to our deliberations on the point 
should be read to limit our power to achieve 
13 Appellee's brief at 16# n.5# 17-20# 25. 
14 See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(3)(a) (providing 
State an appeal from dismissal); Boggess v. Morris9 635 P.2d 39# 
42 (Utah 1981)(prosecution may resort to extraordinary writ if 
information is improperly dismissed). 
9 
that end. 
Id. at page 49, quoting State v. Eldredge# 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). 
The admission of the expert testimony and argument that 
Susan Quas was murdered because her behavior did not fit the 
profile of suicide victims was obvious error - it violated both 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 and 403. Neither Dr. Grey nor Mr. 
Marchant was qualified to present expert testimony on the 
behavioral profile of suicide victims, and even if the proper 
foundation had been laid, such testimony was unduly prejudicial, 
given its lack of probative value. Compare the evidence and 
argument in this case with the facts and rulings in State v. 
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)(the police officer in the Rammel 
case should not have presented testimony concerning a profile of 
the behavior of criminals and the defendant's fitting that 
profile, because of his lack of qualification and because the 
statistical, or profiling evidence was not sufficiently probative 
to outweigh its prejudicial effect); and State v. Rimmasch, 776 
P.2d 388, 403 n.13 and 401-403 (Utah 1989)(citing Rammel to 
explain that profile evidence on behavior of typical abused 
children is improper because it has "a tendency to mislead and 
confuse a finder of fact by suggesting that the issue to be 
decided is whether the accusing child possesses these 
characteristics rather than whether the child experienced the 
specific instances of abuse described"; and discussing the heavy 
foundational burden that precedes the presentation of expert 
10 
profiling testimony). 
The prosecution1s heavy reliance on the improper 
15 
profiling testimony (T. 184-185# 890, 907-908, 945-946) 
underscores the harmful nature of its admission, and suggests 
that this Court should exercise its discretion under the harmless 
error doctrine to correct the trial court and reverse Mr. Quas1 
conviction. Braun, supra. 
V. 
THE CARNER DECISION GOVERNS 
THE SELF-INCRIMINATION ISSUE 
IN THIS CASE. 
A. IN ADOPTING THE STATE'S POSITION THAT FEDERAL PRECEDENTS 
SUPERSEDED A CASE DECIDED UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE TRIAL 
COURT VIOLATED A BASIC TENET OF FEDERALISM. 
When the issue of Mr. Quas' statements to the police 
officers was raised in the suppression hearing, Mr. Quas was 
relying explicitly on Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 
(Utah 1983)(M.H. 84), which was explicitly decided under Article 
I section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 664 P.2d 1168, 1172. The 
prosecutor argued that subsequent federal case law had 
superseded the Carner opinion, and had repudiated the earner 
15 On appeal, it is the State's theory that because the 
expert testimony and argument discussed the "manner of death" of 
Susan Quas, and did not formally reach the question of Mr. Quas's 
having murdered Susan, the evidence was acceptable. Appellee's 
brief at 27 and n. 10. 
The State's argument concerning the propriety of the 
prosecution's discussing Susan Quas's manner of death 
misconstrues the issue before this Court. There is no question 
that it is appropriate for the State to present evidence and 
argument directly on the point of Mr. Quas's guilt. However, 
attempting to prove that Mr. Quas murdered Susan because she did 
not commit suicide because she did not fit within the behavioral 
profile of suicide victims is an improper mode of proof. See 
Rammel and Rimmasch, supra. 
11 
factor relating to the focus of the investigation (R. 439-445; 
M.H. 88). The trial court apparently believed this argument 
and focused solely on the absence of indicia of arrest in 
declining to suppress the statements. 
Federal interpretations of federal case law do not 
supersede state court interpretations of state constitutions. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). The federal 
precedents relied on by the State at trial and on appeal do not 
overrule earner, which is a precedent interpreting Article I 
18 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Aside from this precept of federalism, there is good 
reason for this Court to maintain the integrity of the Carner 
decision and its inquiry into the focus of the investigation. As 
this case demonstrates, if Miranda warnings are only required 
when guns are drawn and handcuffs are locked, police officers can 
manipulate the standard, giving warnings only in cases when 
suspects force their own arrest by physically attempting to leave 
the police. To extend the length of a pre-Miranda interrogation, 
a police officer need only avoid formal arrest. 
16 Under Carner, the factors to be considered to determine 
if a suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings are: 
(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) 
whether the investigation focused on the 
accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of 
arrest were present; and (4) the length and 
form of interrogation. 
Id. at 1171 (emphasis added). 
17 The trial court's ruling is contained in Appendix 4 of 
Appellant's opening brief. 
18 Carner, 664 P.2d at 1272. 
12 
In this case, the police suspected that John Quas had 
murdered Susan Quas prior to entering or within minutes of 
19 
entering the Quas residence. Three or four police officers 
surrounded Mr. Quas, would not let him get up from the kitchen 
table to get a drink or call a friend, took his car keys away, 
offered to let him call a friend to come and get him, took him to 
the police station prior to letting him call the friend, told him 
he was not under arrest, and interrogated him, all without 
Miranda warnings, until Officer Edwards began tape recording the 
20 interrogation. Officer Edwards indicated at the suppression 
hearing that the only reason that he gave Mr. Quas the warnings 
prior to the taped interview was that he was "[bjeing cautious." 
(M.H. 71). 
In the State's only recognition of the earner case on 
21 
appeal, the State argues that Mr. Quas was not entitled to 
Miranda warnings because no police officer said to him, "John 
22 
Quas, I accuse you of murdering your wife." This argument 
19 Appellant's opening brief 45-48. 
20 Appellant's opening brief at 45-47. 
21 The State again relies primarily on federal precedents. 
Appellee's brief at 32-34. 
22 The State argues, 
[T]he court [in earner] elaborated on 
factors it considered when 
determining whether an accused who 
has not been formally arrested is 
in custody. They are: (1) the site 
of the interrogation; (2) whether 
the investigation focused on the 
accused; (3) whether the objective 
indicia of arrest were present; and 
13 
places undue emphasis on the word "accused" in the earner 
opinion, which word was merely used as a synonym for person. 
Focus of the investigation, not formal accusation, is a 
precursor to Miranda warnings. See earner factor 2, 664 P.2d at 
1171 (focus of the investigation), and Appellant's opening brief 
at 45 through 50 (showing that Mr. Quas was the focus of the 
investigation from moments after the investigation began). 
This Court should maintain the tradition under the Utah 
Constitution of providing uniquely broad protection to the right 
23 
against self incrimination, and reverse the trial court's error 
(4) the length and form of 
interrogation. • . . 
• •• In light of Carner, it is important to 
note that here defendant was accused of 
nothing at the time of his interview with 
Detective Edwards and that at that time it 
had not been ascertained yet that a crime had 
been committed.* Police considered both 
homicide and suicide as possibilities,* and 
Dr. Grey had not conducted the autopsy. 
Defendant was a suspect in the investigation 
as it related to the possibilities of 
homicide, but none of the objective indicia 
of arrest was present (S.H. 76-77).... 
Appellee's brief at 34 (emphasis by the State). 
*note the absence of supporting record citations. 
23 See Carner, supray State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969 
(Utah 1967)(under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
it was improper to fail to warn a witness at grand jury 
proceedings that he was the target of the investigation); In Re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988)(under Article I 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, in exercising subpoena 
powers, the attorney general must warn those upon whom the 
investigation focuses that they are the target of the 
investigation). 
14 
of law in failing to follow the controlling Utah law.H 
B. MR. QUAS' OBJECTIONS TO THE STATEMENTS TAKEN AT HIS RESIDENCE 
WERE NOT WAIVED. 
The State argues that Mr. Quas has waived his 
opportunity to object to the statements taken at the Quas 
residence# and is limited to discussing the statements made at 
25 the police station. 
Mr. Quas' motion to suppress encompassed "any and all" 
statements taken in violation of his rights (R. 412). The trial 
court's legal error in failing to apply the earner analysis 
would not have been corrected by further emphasizing the 
statements made at the Quas residence, and thus seems to moot the 
waiver argument. Nonetheless, the circumstances at the Quas 
residence were discussed at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress. 
While at the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense 
counsel's primary focus was on the statements made to Officer 
Edwards at the police station, the facts surrounding the 
interrogation at the Quas residence were discussed by Mr. Quas. 
Although his memory of the events was poor, he indicated that 
there were three or four police officers present and that he had 
spoken with Officer Edwards (M.H. 48-51). Mr. Quas also 
indicated that prior to leaving the Quas residence, when Officer 
24 This Court owes the trial court no deference in 
correcting the trial court's error of law. Western Fiberglass v. 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34, 37 (Utah App. 1990). 
25 Appellee's Brief at 29 through 31. 
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Edwards offered to let him call a friend to pick him up, he did 
not call the friend because Officer Edwards told him he was going 
to the police station (M.H. 54). Mr. Quas indicated that Officer 
Edwards first read him his rights during the interview at the 
police station (M.H. 55). 
Officer Edwards also testified that he spoke with Mr. 
Quas at his home (M.H. 67). He indicated that Mr. Quas was taken 
to the police station by Officer Cox (M.H. 74). When first asked 
if Mr. Quas was free to leave his residence, Officer Edwards 
indicated that the thought had not crossed anyone's mind, but 
that he "imagined" Mr. Quas was free to leave. When the 
prosecutor, in the next question, asked him again if Mr. Quas was 
free to leave his home and not go to the police station. Officer 
Edwards indicated that he was (M.H. 68-69). 
Officer Edwards indicated that at the Quas residence, 
prior to Mr. Quas' transportation to the police station, 
Officer Edwards suspected that Mr. Quas had murdered Susan (M.H. 
76), and that Mr. Quas was the strongest suspect in his mind 
(M.H. 78). 
While the trial court's ruling focused primarily on the 
circumstances at the police station, the trial court did mention 
that the record was "very unclear" about whether or not the 
circumstances at the Quas residence prior to Mr. Quas' going to 
2 ft 
the police department were voluntary. 
26 The trial court's findings state, 
...Defendant indicated that he wanted to 
leave. It would appear, through the record 
16 
The language of the motion in limine and the legal and 
factual issues discussed at the suppression hearing are adequate 
to preserve this issue for appeal. 
However, this Court should further consider the fact 
that the State did not reveal the strongest evidence of custody 
(Carner factor 3) justifying suppression of the statements at the 
Quas residence and at the police station until Officer Spann 
testified at trial, and indicated that at the Quas residence, he 
and the other Officers forced Mr. Quas to stay at the kitchen 
table and did not allow him to get up to get a drink or make a 
2 7 phone call (T. 353, 360). Up until Officer Spann's testimony, 
is very unclear, that Officer Lamont Cox 
asked Defendant if he wanted to go to the 
West Valley Police Station, and Defendant 
responded in the affirmative. 
R. 446 (Appendix 4 of Appellant's Opening Brief). 
27 When Officer Spann tried to obtain a transcript of his 
tape recorded police report made on the night of Susan Quas's 
death, Officer Edwards told him that he could not find it (T. 
342-343). In fact, the report could not be found through 
subsequent efforts (T. 343). 
The State argues, 
.... 
[A] review of Sgt. Spann's testimony at the preliminary 
hearing and trial reveals no material differences. 
Even if Sgt. Spann testified in greater detail at 
trial, the defense not only had access to his police 
report before the preliminary hearing but also had 
ample opportunity to cross examine him then. 
Appellee's brief at 10 n. 4. 
After Mr. Quas moved to supplement the record with a 
copy of Officer Spann's police report, this Court indicated that 
because the report was not presented to the court at trial, 
reliance on the report on appeal is improper. 
In Officer Spann's preliminary hearing testimony (P.H.2 
17-23), his only reference to the custodial circumstances of Mr. 
Quas at the Quas residence again was "Once we were able to get 
Mr. Quas into the kitchen area..." (P.H. 2 20). See Appendix 2. 
The preliminary hearing focused on probable cause, 
17 
every other police officer had indicated that Mr, Quas was not 
2 8 physically restrained or detained* 
The late revelation of this evidence by the State 
explains why defense counsel was not aware of the need to further 
emphasize the statements taken at the Quas residence/ and 
explains why this Court should adopt the order of proof discussed 
in State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 185 (Utah 1943), and Appellant's 
29 
opening brief at 42-43. 
rather than admissibility of evidence, and thus did not focus on 
the custodial nature of Mr. Quas's interrogation on the night of 
Susan's death. Indeed, after the motion to suppress had been 
resolved against Mr. Quas, it is a fortunate coincidence that 
Officer Spann's testimony relating to the custodial nature of Mr. 
Quas's interrogation was revealed at trial. 
28 For example, at the suppression hearing, Officer 
Edwards indicated that Mr. Quas was free to leave from his 
residence (M.H. 69) and from the police station (M.H. 72-73). 
Apparently because the police had seized Mr. Quas's car keys for 
"evidence" (M.H. 80), Officer Edwards testified that he asked Mr. 
Quas if he had a friend to come and pick him up at the police 
station prior to the taped interview (M.H. 70). Officer Edwards 
testified that he got the telephone number of Mr. Quas's friend, 
Russ Wagner, out of the phone book, gave the to Mr. Quas, and 
directed him to call Mr. Wagner up (M.H. 70). 
29 The State's effort to distinguish the Crank case by 
noting that the court chose the word "confession", while Mr. Quas 
uses the words "custodial statements". Appellee's brief at 37 
n.15, perhaps can be resolved by noting that yet a third synonym 
is used in the constitutional provision interpreted in Crank, and 
raised explicitly in Mr. Quas's motion to suppress (R. 412), 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution: "The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." 
(emphasis added). 
The State's argument that this Utah Constitutional 
argument has not been briefed adequately for this Court to 
address it on appeal, Appellee's brief at 37 n.15, is rebutted 
through reference to State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985), 
which was cited by the Utah Supreme Court as a "summary of 
scholarly commentary and analytic technique" in briefing of state 
constitutional issues. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 
1986). In Jewett, the court stated, 
18 
C. THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT PRESENTED AS IMPEACHMENT, AND THEIR 
ADMISSION WAS NOT HARMLESS. 
The State argues that the statements in question were 
30 permissible as impeachment evidence. The State introduced this 
evidence, as promised in its opening argument (T. 183, 188) as 
part of its case in chief (T. 241, 287-288, 305, 338, 375-376, 
344, 392, 375-378, 453-460, 474) before Mr. Quas testified (T. 
803-861). In these circumstances, the evidence does not qualify 
as impeachment evidence under the precedents relied on by the 
State. E.g. State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1112-1113 (Utah App. 
1988)(statements are used to "attack the credibility of 
defendant's trial testimony", and should be accompanied with jury 
instructions on limited use of the evidence); Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222 (1971)(statements rendered inadmissible in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief may be used to impeach the 
credibility of trial testimony). 
Mr. Quas agrees that there is no Sixth Amendment issue 
31 . 32 
before this Court, and to his knowledge, has not raised one. 
When a state constitutional issue is squarely 
raised on appeal, and it appears the issue 
has possible merit, if the briefing is 
inadequate, we will order a rebriefing or 
address the issue. Otherwise it will seem 
that we are "decided only to be undecided, 
resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, 
... all-powerful for impotence." 
Id. at 236, quoting W. Churchill, While England Slept (1938). 
30 Appellee's brief at 37 through 38. 
31 Appellee's Brief at 38 n. 17. 
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The argument that the admission of the statements to 
the police officers was harmless error in light of the 
presentation of the statements themselves and other evidence 
33 presented at trial, should be evaluated in light of the 
emphasis the prosecution placed on the statements in opening and 
closing argument (T. 183, 188, 894-902), in light of the improper 
nature of other evidence relied on by the State, and in light of 
the fact that this constitutional violation requires this Court 
to find any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)• 
VI. 
THE ADMISSION OF SUSAN QUAS" STATEMENTS 
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The State acknowledges that under controlling 
precedents, in order to admit Susan Quas' statements that one 
day the police would come and find her dead, to find that her 
husband had killed her and was the guilty one, the State should 
have demonstrated that the statements were probative of "the 
decedent's state of mind at the time of the killing. However, 
on appeal, as at trial, the State fails to make the requisite 
showing. The State argues that the statements were admitted to 
rebut the claim that Susan Quas committed suicide, but fails to 
32 But see Appellant's opening brief at page 50-51, 
indicating that once Mr. Quas was informed of his Miranda rights, 
Officer Edwards violated Mr. Quas's right against self-
incrimination, in continuing to interrogate Mr. Quas after Mr. 
Quas invoked his right to counsel. 
33 Appellee's brief at 38. 
34 Appellee's brief at 40. 
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explain how, taken in context, they do so. 
As noted extensively in Appellant's Opening Brief, an 
examination of the contexts in which the statements were made 
does not support this argument. See Appellant's Brief at 53-56. 
The State's claim that the evidence was necessary to 
rebut the suicide claim raised by the defense# should be 
evaluated in light of the State's expert testimony that Susan 
Quas was not a suicidal person (T. 721-735). See State v. Auble, 
754 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 1988). 
While the trial court gave repeated instructions on the 
37 
abstract concept of limited use of evidencef such instructions 
are not an adequate assurance that the evidence will be limited 
to its proper use. See State v. Auble# 754 P.2d 935# 937 (Utah 
1988); State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377, 1379-1381 (Utah 1977); 
prosecutor's argument to the trial court that statements were 
admissible to show the identity of the murderer (T. 278). 
VII. 
MR. QUAS WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE 
THE JURORS INSTRUCTED PROPERLY. 
Mr. Quas was entitled to have the jurors instructed 
properly on his theory of the case and the law. State v. Potter, 
35 Appellee's brief at 40. 
36 Appellee's brief at 40-41. 
Given Susan Quas's proclivity toward guns# drinking, 
and feigning suicide, and her condition on the night of her 
death, Mr. Quas's defense was not limited to suicide, but also 
encompassed the possibility that Susan had an accident (T. 193# 
915). 
37 Appellee's Brief at 41. 
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627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). 
A. FLIGHT INSTRUCTION 
The State argues that the trial court was correct in 
denying Mr. Quas' requested flight instruction because there was 
no basis for it in the record.38 At the time of trial, defense 
counsel had to make the best of the trial court's ruling that Mr. 
Quas was not in custody and spent the evening with the police 
voluntarily, and thus sought to establish Mr. Quas1 cooperation 
with the police (T. 360).39 
Although the State claims that jury instructions 5 
through 11 were cumulative to Mr. Quas' requested flight 
instruction and made it unnecessary for the trial court to give 
the instruction, a review of those instructions indicates that 
the instructions do not convey the information in the instruction 
requested by Mr. Quas. See Appendix 3 to this brief, including 
instructions 5 through 11. 
B. PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
The trial court's "statements" to the prospective 
jurors concerning the meaning of the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of proof, and the prosecutor's opening argument 
concerning the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof were 
38 Appellee's brief at 43. 
39 The absence of explicit argument on point is explained 
by the trial court's ruling that instructing on the inferences to 
be drawn from Mr. Quas's failure to flee would be an improper 
comment on the evidence. 
40 Appellee's brief at 43-44. 
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incorrect statements of the law* Rather than correcting this 
error by giving the instruction requested by the defense, which 
instruction is a clear statement of the law, the trial court 
instructed the jurors that doubt is reasonable when it "is based 
on reason", when it is "reasonable in view of all the evidence"# 
and when it would be held by "reasonable men and women". 
Instruction 7. The instruction requested by the defense was more 
concrete and understandable and should have been given (R. 596). 
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75f 80 (Utah 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
Because the original dismissal of this case should not 
have been overturned, this Court should reverse Mr. Quas• 
conviction, and order the case dismissed. At the least, Mr. Quas 
is entitled to a new trial comporting with his constitutional 
rights, and other laws governing fair trials, 
Respectfully submitted this //] day of 
1990. 
^HAC\. L™i 
LISA J. RJtMAL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-1 (1953 as amended) provides: 
78-1-1. Courts of justice enumerated. 
The following are the courts of justice of this 
state: 
(1) the Supreme Court; 
(2) the Court of Appeals; 
(3) the district courts; 
(4) the circuit courts; 
(5) the juvenile courts; and 
(6) the justices7 courts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-2 (1953 as amended) provides: 
78-1-2. Courts of record enumerated. 
The courts enumerated in the first five subdivisions 
[subsections] of the preceding section [§ 78-1-1] 
are courts of record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1990) provides in pertinent part: 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any 
court of record involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the 
prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds 
of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides: 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise. 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
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BY MR. MATHESON: 
Q . Please state your full name and spell it 









Russell Edward Span, S-p-a-n. 
By whom are you employed? 
West Valley City Police Department. 
And what is your position there? 
I'm a patrol sergeant. 
And how long have you held that position? 
Since April 19th, 1987. 
Sergeant Span, on June 15, 1987, did you 
receive a call to go to the residence of John Quas? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. And did you go to that residence? 




What time did you arrive? 
2148 hours. 9:48 p.m. 
And after your arrival at the Quas 
residence, did there come a time when you entered the 
home itself? 
A. Yes, there did. 
Q. And upon entry what did you discover? 
A. I found Mrs. Quas laying prone in the 
living room area suffering from a gun shot wound to 
the face. 
2
 I Q- And to reur Personal knowledge, Sergeant, 
3 had any police or paramedics moved the body? 
4 A. No, they had not. 
5
 Q- And in fact, Sergeant, what is standard 
6 procedure with respect to touching or moving a body 
7 under these circumstances? 
8 A- To sustain a live there would be movement 
9 of the body; if not, there would be no movement of the 
10 body at all to protect the crime scene. 
H [ Q- Did you talk with John Quas? 
12 A. Yes, I did . 
13 Q. When did that conversation take place? 
14 A. Approximately three to five minutes after 
\5 I arrived at the residence. 
16 Q. And where did that conversation take 
\7 place? 
18 A. First in the hallway in the residence, 
19 which was at the top of the stairs, and then in the 
30 kitchen area . 
31 Q. Could you des c ribe more specifically the 
32 hallway in relation to the rest of the house? 
33 A. Yes. It's a single family residence. On 
34 the north side of the road facing south there's a 

























You walk into the residence and it's a 
split-level residence. You go up the stairs and off 
the•right-hand of the stairway is the living room area 
and straight ahead is the kitchen area and off to the 
left is a hallway. I believe there's two bedrooms on 
the left side of the hallway and one bedroom on the 
far right end of the hallway and a bathroom on the 
right side of the hallway. 
Q. All right. Now, did Mr. Quas say anything 
about what he was doing when his wife had been shot? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. He stated that he was in the shower. 
Q. 
A. 
And did he say anything else? 
He stated that he was in the shower and 
heard the gun shot and came out and found his wife 
laying on the floor and then contacted 911. 
Q. Now, when you talked with Mr. Quas did you 
have an opportunity to observe his appearance? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And could you describe his appearance 
during that time when you were talking to him? 
A. He was wearing a long dark robe. It 
appeared that his hair was wet on the top, but not 
1 soaked to the roots and his hands were extremely 
2 dirty . 
3 Q. Did you take an opportunity to observe th 
4 hallway? 
5 A* Yes, I did. There was a plastic runner o 
6 that hallway and I did not observe any water on that 
7 mat down the hallway towards the bathroom. 
8 Q. Did the observations you've just told us 
9 about lead you to take any further action? 
10 A. Yes, they did. Once we were able to get 
11 Mr. Quas into the kitchen area, I walked down the 
12 hallway to the first door on the right, the bathroom 
13 area anyway, and went into the bathroom area. 
14 Q. And what did you find there? 
15 A. At that time I observed the floor was dry 
16 in the bathroom area and I further observed that the 
17 shower area, the bath tub and the side walls, were 
18 dry. 
19 Q. And when did this inspection of the 
20 bathroom take place? 
21 A. It would have been within 15 minutes afte 
22 my arrival. 
23 Q. At the residence? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Do you recall what you did after 
1 inspecting the bathroom? 
2 A. I went back outside into the hallway area, 
3 at which time I heard the washing machine going in the 
4 basement area. I then went down the stairs to the 
5 basement area and found the washing machine running 
6 and stopped the washing machine. 
7 Q. And after that happened, did you hear Mr. 
8 Quas say anything about the washing machine? 
9 A. Yes. In reference to my stopping the 
10 washing machine he stated that he was washing clothes 
11 for a vacation that he and his wife were going to take 
12 to Nevada. 
13 MR. MATHESON: Thank you, Sergeant. I 
14 have no further questions. 
15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
16 BY MS. JOHNSON: 
17 Q. Sergeant Span, you arrived at the scene --
18 when you arrived at the scene on June 15th how many 
19 other officers were there at that time? 
20 A. Two other officers. 
21 Q. On June 15th you made all of these 
22 observations, did you not? 
2 3 A. Yes, ma'am. 
24 Q. You made the observations concerning Mr. 
25 Quas's appearance, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
2 I Q. Did you write a report about all of this, 
3 Sergeant Span? 
4 A. I taped a report. 
5 Q. And when did you do that? 
6 A. That evening. 
7 Q. And did you provide that tape report to 
8 Detective Edwards? 
9 A. The tape report was turned into our 
10 records division to be transcribed. 
11 Q. All right. And so all of that information 
12 was then available on the evening that you observed 
13 all of this information at the Quas home, is that 
14 correct? 
15 A. I'm not sure I understand. I provided the 
16 tape to the records division. However, I found later 
17 that the tape was not transcribed. 
18 Q. All right. Now, you testified that you 
19 checked the bathro.om about 15 minutes after you 
20 arrived at the Quas home, is that right? 
21 A. Yes, ma'am. 
22 Q. Okay. Did you observe whether or not 
23 there were any windows open in the bathroom? 
24 A. No, I did not. 
25 Q. Do you recall whether there were windows 
1 open in the bathroom? 
2 I A• I don f t recall . 
Q. Do you recall what the temperature was in 
4 I the home? 
5 A. No, I do not. 
6 Q. Do you recall what the temperature was 
7 outside? 
8 A. No, ma'am, I do not. 
9 Q. Could you describe what the weather was 
10 like that night? 
11 A. It was warm. It was June 15th. That's 
12 the best I can recall. 
13 Q. I didn't catch that last statement? 
14 A. It was June 15th. 
15 Q. June 15th? 
16 A. Yes, ma'am. 
17 Q. Would it be fair to say it was summery 
18 weather? 
19 A. Yes, ma'am. 
20 Q. Concerning the observations you made, the 
21 washing machine running, all of that was made on June 
22 the 15th? 
23 A. Yes, ma'am. 
24 MS. JOHNSON: No further questions. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Matheson. 
1 MR. MATHESON: No further questions, Your 
2 Honor. 
3 THE COURT: You may step down. Your next 
4 witness. 
5 MR. MATHESON: Your Honor, I need to check 
6 to see if the next witness has arrived. 
7 MS. REMAL: We have no objection to 
8 Sergeant Span leaving if he wants to. 
9 MR. MATHESON: I think he may wish to 
10 leave, if that's all right with the Court. 
11 MS. REMAL: That's fine. 
12 MR. MATHESON: Thank you. We're going 
13 slightly out of the originally intended order, Your 
14 Honor. 
15 THE COURT: I knew that we had sworn 
16 Detective Edwards but you were looking for someone 
17 else. I suspected you were going out of order. 
18 MR. MATHESON: Your Honor, as you'll 
19 recall, we marked six exhibits at the last preliminary 
20 I hearing. I think at this time I would like to move 
21 for their readmission. 
22 THE COURT: I don't think you have to do 
23 that, do you? 
24 MR. MATHESON: I don't know. 
25 THE COURT: You want to be extra cautious. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. £^ 
It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the 
law applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to 
follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that 
are presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this 
court and the defendant's plea of Mnot guilty". This duty you 
should perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion 
or prejudice against him. You must not suffer yourselves to be 
biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has been 
arrested for this offense, or because an Information has been filed 
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to 
stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you 
are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them 
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in 
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. ' The law forbids 
you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion ot public feeling. Both the State of 
Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and 
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider 
and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will 
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such 
verdict may be. The verdict must express the individual opinion 
of each juror. 
INSTRUCTION NO. L 
At times throughout the trial the court has been called 
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence might pro-
perly be admitted. You are not to be concerned with the reasons 
for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. 
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question 
of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, 
the court does not determine what weight should be given such 
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness. 
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor 
any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any question to 
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to 
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the 
objection. 
n n A w - « f 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are 
in favor of innocence• A defendant is presumed innocent until 
he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of 
a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
The burden is on the State to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. A 
reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense and not on 
speculation or imagination. It is a doubt that is reasonable 
in view of all of the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt must satisfy the mind and convince those who are bound to 
act conscientiously upon such proof. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt that reasonable men and women would hold after 
consideration of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
nnriem/L 
INSTRUCTION NO. $ 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should 
reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But 
where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final 
judges and must determine from the evidence what the facts 
are. There are no definite rules governing how you shall 
determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or 
how you shall determine what the facts in this case are. But 
you should carefully and conscientiously consider and compare 
all of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances, 
which have a bearing on any issue, and determine therefrom 
what the facts are. You are not bound to believe all that 
the witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of 
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable and convincing 
in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. 
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against 
a fewer number in accordance with your honest convictions. The 
testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on 
one matter is naturally less convincing on other matters. So 
if you believe a witness has wilfully testified falsely as to 
any material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of 
the testimony of such witness, or you may give it such weight 
as you think it is entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ? 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight 
of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a 
right to take into consideration their bias, their interest in 
the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof 
to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the wit-
nesses1 deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of 
their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want 
of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, 
and their capacity to remember. You should consider these matters 
together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you 
may believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the 
witnesses f statement. 
INSTRUCTION NO. I & 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent 
witness in his own behalf and his testimony should be re-
ceived and given the same consideration as you give to that 
of any other witness. The fact that he stands accused of a 
crime is no evidence of his guilt and is no reason for reject-
ing his testimony. However, you should weigh his testimony 
the same as you weigh the testimony of any other witness. 
INSTRUCTION NO. // 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the 
opinion of a witness to be received in evidence. However, an 
exception to this rule exists in the case of an expert witness. 
An expert witness is a person who by education, study or ex-
perience has become an expert in any art, science, trade or 
profession, and who is called as a witness to give this opinion 
as to any such matter in which he is versed and which is mater-
ial to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and 
should weigh the reasons, if any, which are given for it. How-
ever, you are not bound by such an opinion. You may give to it 
the weight to which you deem it is entitled, whether that be 
great or slight, and you may reject it entirely, if in your judg-
ment the reasons given for it are unsound. 
